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The cases are numerous in which garages have been
held to be violations of various building restrictions. 20 A
few cases, however, disclose a liberal attitude in freeing
garages from the withering blight of restrictions placed on
premises before automobiles were as numerous
as they are
21
today or before they were in existence.
A recent case in Oklahoma decided that a municipal
ordinance forbidding a filling station within certain distances of churches and schools was a valid one, the court
taking judicial notice that such a station22in a residential
neighborhood would constitute a nuisance.
In Blaustein v. Pincus2a leased premises were used as
a lodging house. The landlord leased the adjoining premises to a tenant to use as a garage. The subsequent use of
this land as a garage was held to constitute an eviction of
the adjoining tenant so as to relieve from liability for rent.
HAROLD S. IRWIN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS-The bald
statement that this or that amendment to a constitution
is unconstitutional, is more or less startling to those who
have given serious thought to the construction and interpretation of constitutions, and their functions in the business of governing a people. Such statements are, however,
quite commonly made, seemingly without consciousness of
the apparent incongruity involved. In fact, the very frequency with which they are encountered, both within and
without the ranks of the legal profession, provokes inquiry
as to possible foundations for the statement among the
recognized canons of constitutional interpretation.
The ordinary and accepted meaning of 'unconstitutionality', as it is most frequently applied to statutes, is
2

ORinggold v. Denhardt, 110 Atl. 321 (Md. 1920); Evans v. Foss,
80 N. E. 587 (Mass. 1907); Riverbank Co. v. Bancroft, 95 N. E. 216
(Mass. 1911); Williams v. Carr, 248 S. W. 625 (Mo. 1923); Hepburn
v. Long, 131 N. Y. S. 154 (1911); Perpall v. Gload, 190 N. Y. S. 417
(1921); Wilmot v. Gandy, 203 N. Y. S. 535 (1923).
21
Beckwith v. Pirung, 119 N. Y. S. 444 (1909); Hammond v. Constant, 168 N. Y. S. 384 (1917); Riverbank Co. v. Bancroft, 95 N. E.
216 (Mass. 1911); Ronan v. Barr, 89 Atl. 282 (N. J. 1913).
22
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Wright, (Old. 1926).
28131 Pac. 1064 (Mont. 1913).
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that the particular enactment in question violates some
express or implied principle or precept of the etisting
Constitution and must fall before it, since the latter, in our
system of government, is made the supreme law of the
land. Allegations of unconstitutionality, i. e., invalidity because of conflict with the supreme existing law, in the case
of an amendment, seem incongruous because the only proper purpose of an amendment is to change or alter the existing Constitution in some respect, and it is diametrically
opposed to the idea of the continued supremacy of the elder
provision. To defeat an amendment on the ground of inconsistency with the existing general provisions of the
Constitution, would be a denial of the power to change the
Constitution in the orderly manner therein provided.
It is for this reason that a constitution usually dictates
a definite method of amendment, differing, in same important respects, from the requirements in the case of ordinary
legislation, chiefly because of the higher sanctity to be accorded to the constitutional enactment. Written constitutions are practically the only examples to be found in the
field of legal enactment in which the old law is given the
power to destroy the new. True, in legal fiction, constitutions and statutes are the enactments of entirely different
legislative bodies. Yet where shall we find any effectual
difference between a theoretical expression of the will of
the people through the medium of their chosen representatives in legislative assembly met, and through the same, or
other, chosen representatives in constitutional convention
met? It is absurd to say in either case that it is an expression of the will of the people, or the act of the people
in their sovereign capacity, because, and fortunately perhaps for our general welfare, there can be no such thing
in our system of government as a direct act of the people,
or an authoritative expression of the will of the people.
Even revolution, the vaunted last resort of a people, cannot be so classed, as it is outside of government.
Our present government might be classed, by borrowing the adjective, as a "limited" democracy, republican in
form. It is a government "of the people, and for the
people", though fortunately-saving possible lese majeste
-NOT "by the people" but by representatives, as we call
them. The only step forward (although even the direction
of the step is sometimes open to challenge) which we have
made, is in the manner of choosing and limiting the activity of our rulers. Popular election does not insure the
securing of better rulers, but it does furnish a more hu-
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mane, and perhaps easier method of getting rid of the bad
ones than did the guillotine and the regicide.
The people, denominated as the source of sovereign
power, can act only through representatives in the promulgation of either statutes or constitutions. It would
surely be unflattering to suppose either that the constitutional conventions are composed of more capable minds
than the legislative assemblies, or that the same representative body would give more unselfish or more carefully considered attention to the problems of government when
acting as a constitutional convention that when acting as
a legislative assembly. This dual function has been fastened upon our legislative assemblies for the purpose of
enacting amendments to the Federal Constitution.
It is not easy to believe that the framers of the Federal Constitution, with all of the wisdom they have shown
in other matters, intended to put their trust in any such
factors. Instead, they plainly resorted to the more or less
mechanical expedient of surrounding the act of constitutional alteration with more than the usual difficulties and
checks, and requiring approval by a greater number of
assemblies, or a larger proportion of the members thereof,
hoping that the increase in the hazard might cause the
less worthy proposals to fall by the wayside.
Strict compliance with these mechanical or formal requirements of the act of constitutional amendment, has always been regarded, by critics of constitutional theory and
by the courts, as absolutely essential if their intended benefit is to be realized. Some authorities suggest that the
unanimous consent of the states would be necessary to
the validity of an amendment changing that article of the
Federal Constitution which declares the due and proper
requisites of an amendment which declares the due- and
proper requisites of an amendment, even though those
requisites had been fully observed, and ratification by threefourths of the states secured.
In this requirement of strict compliance with formal
requisites, we seem to find a possible foundation for the
idea that an amendment, or at least what purports to be an
amendment, may be invalid and inoperative because it has
not fulfilled all of the formal requisites set forth in the
Constitution. In such case it must be a mere nullity. Here,
indeed, is a proper question for someone to decide: whether
or not an alleged amendment, apparently proposed and
ratified in the manner dictated by Article 5, has, in fact,
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failed to measure up in some respects to these requirements, and is really not an amendment at all.
A proper question indeed, but proper for whom, or for
what body, to decide? The Constitution is discouragingly
silent on the point, so the Supreme Court has once more
generously, and with characteristic and engaging modesty,
discovered, to its great surprise, that it is the only body
in whom the Constitution could have intended to repose
this high responsibility of guarding the sanctuary against
the assault of pretenders with spurious credentials.
Thus we find that the Supreme Court could, and should,
agreeably to reason and the strict principles of constitutional theory, declare unconstitutional an alleged amendment to the Federal Constitution that had not been in fact
properly proposed or ratified in the manner set forth in
Article 5.
Turning, for the moment, to the field of federal and
state sovereignty, we will assume, without argument, the
principle which has been established at so great cost, that
whenever the provisions of a state constitution are in direct
conflict with those of the Federal Constitution, the former
must be invalid, i. e., unconstitutional, by force of the latter.
Here again, the question being one which directly concerns
the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court, or any other
court, could properly declare unconstitutional an alleged
amendment to a state constitution. But, of course, it would
be not an amendment in the proper sense of the word.
What has been said with reference to alleged amendments to the Federal Constitution being invalid or unconstitutional through non-compliance with the formal
requisites therein provided for proposal and ratification of
amendments, applies with equal force to amendments to
state constitutions. All state constitutions have some similar provisions dictating the formal requisites for amendment. This supplies a third ground for holding alleged
amendments unconstitutional.
It would be impossible to pass the subject of this
discussion without reference to a fourth ground which has
been strongly and ably urged in cases involving the
eighteenth amendment, and which challenges attention and
inquiry. It is that an alleged amendment, notwithstanding
strict compliance with the formal requirements of the Constitution, may be invalid because it is utterly foreign to
that intent and spirit which may be gathered from a consideration of the Constitution as a perfect whole, and because it is not properly of that class of provisions which
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are, and should be, included in the frame of a government.
Or, in other words, that because it is so patently out of
place in an instrument of the character of the Federal
Constitution, it transcends the whole power of amendment
contemplated by Article 5. The proponents of this theory
define such an extraordinary power of amendment to be
within the purview of the powers reserved expressly to
the states or to the people by Article 10, and thus, still by
their theory, to be beyond the amending power given by
Article 5, and subject to exercise only by unanimous consent of the states and the people thereof.
Two questions seem to present themselves: first,
whether such an amendment could be unconstitutional for
the reasons advanced; and second, whether, if that be so,
the Supreme Court could conceivably declare it invalid. An
adequate treatment of the first question would require
more space than this inquiry affords, but possibly a brief
consideration of the second question may settle, for all
practical purposes, the points involved. This discussion
therefore, will be confined as much as possible to the latter
point.
The power of the Supreme Court to declare amendments invalid, must be analogous to the power which it
assumes to declare statutes invalid, and rest on the same
foundation. This power has perhaps been too long assumed
by the Court to be now called into serious question. The
arguments which the Court has advanced in support of the
power, seem to be predicated upon the impropriety of
allowing nullification of the constitutional action of a
people by a legislative department which owes its existence
solely to such action.
The Supreme Court,. itself a department of the government, is now asked to consider the allegation that an
amendment is invalid because its subject matter is not
germane to the intent and spirit of the Constitution, and
is inimical to the proper functioning of the governmental
institutions thereby created. Can the Court even consider
such an allegation, although only to say that the amendment does not violate the amending power set forth in
Article 5? It is not reasonably conceivable that the Court
has the power to declare invalid that article of the original Constitution by which the Court itself was created and
its powers conferred upon it. Are we to say, then, that
the Court has not the power to declare invalid a provision
of the existing Constitution, yet has the power to do so
with a new amendment? If this state of facts could exist,
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would it be because the amendment is not a part of the
Constitution until it has been declared valid by the Court.?
Or because, through infancy or some other disability, the
new amendment does not enjoy the same degree of sanctity as the elder provision? The first hypothesis would require a reversal of all accepted theories of the operation
of legislation, while the second would require an equally
startling revision of the accepted meaning of the word
amendment.
The common understanding and construction of an
amendment to anything is that it is of higher sanctity
than the thing which it amends, which must yield to its operation. Were this not so, it would be futile to attempt
to change or amend our institutions to meet the demands
of changed economic conditions.
If the Supreme Court, created by, and owing its authority and existence to the Constitution, should assume the
power to consider the validity or invalidity of a constitutional amendment on other than the strictly formal ground
of due and proper observance of the requisites for proposal
and ratification, it would be assuming the power to nullify
and destroy itself, of its own force, a power which no
artificial creation can conceivably possess. The power to
consider at all the validity of any legislative or constitutional act, can only mean the power to declare whether or
not it is valid. The fact that it is declared valid, must
necessarily comprehend the fact that it could have been declared invalid if competent facts had been shown which
would establish its invalidity. Otherwise a declaration of
its validity would be but the most ridiculous brutum fulmen.
The impotence of a court to decide constitutional
questions involving its own existence has long been recognized. In Luther v. Borden, 7 Howad 1, (1849), the Court,
speaking through the Chief Justice, said: "* * * and if a

state court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this
case, and should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been put aside and displaced
by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court,
and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision on the
question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court,
it.
necessarily affirms the existence and the authority of
the government under which it is exercising judicial power".
This reasoning is cited with approval by Chief Justice
Day, of the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Koehler
v. Hill, 60 Ia. 543 (1883), commenting on it as follows:
"That this reasoning is eminently sound, no one can doubt.
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A court which, under the circumstances named, should
enter into an inquiry as to the existence of the constitution
under which it was acting, would be like a man trying to
prove his personal existence, and would be obliged to
assume the very point in dispute before taking the first
step in the argument".
The decision that an amendment, properly proposed
and ratified, was invalid as in violation of the intent and
spirit of the Constitution, would in itself be a change in the
Constitution by the judicial department, since it would
introduce a test not contemplated by the Constitution. The
carefully stated provisions of Article 5, setting forth the
only aceptable modes of amendment, reveal a distrust on
the part of the framers in the theory of constitutional
changes by any or all of the departments of government.
It is to be remembered that the framers had an intimate
acquaintance with the English system of constitutional
changes by legislative act or judicial decision. Is it illogical
to suppose that a strong belief in the responsibility of this
system for some of the grievances which led up to the
struggle for independence, may have impelled the new nation to put temptation out of their reach? It may well
have been the most impelling reason for the making of
any written constitution at all, and therefore the very
ark of the covenant.
The Supreme Court seems to suggest this view in the
case of Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 (1921), by the use
of the following language: "The plain meaning of this (Art.
5) is that all amendments must have the sanction of the
people of the United States, the original fountain of power,
acting through representative assemblies, and that ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of the states shall
be taken as a decisive expression of the people's will and
binding upon all". Surely this high sanction would be
discredited, and the flow of this fountain stopped, by the
decision of any court that an amendment, duly proposed,
and ratified with all solemnity by the people in their chosen
medium of constitutional activity, was invalid because of
conflict with the intent and spirit of the existing Constitution.
And yet the Supreme Court has been asked, in the
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920), to take
jurisdiction of just such a question. And the Court not
only took jurisdiction, but rendered a decision on the validity of the eighteenth amendment, on the ground, inter alia,
that its terms did not overstep any implied limitations on

.168
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the amending power, which could be gathered only from
the general intent and spirit of the Constitution. Unfortunately the Court declined to answer categorically the
arguments advanced in support of the theory, so it is impossible to be certain of its reasons for taking jurisdiction
of such a question.
Considering the arguments advanced in the above
cases, to establish the invalidity of the amendment, it is
undoubtedly sound principle that such substantive and
municipal legislation as there exists, restrictive in high
degree of the sphere of individual activity and existing
property rights, is out of place in a relatively unchangeable
constitution, which is properly classed as a framework of
government and the repository of fundamental rights.
Such legislation represents only a transitory wave of public
opinion and should be in a form more easily responsive to
public opinion. However, saving all of the arguments against
it. is it not possible that they were submitted to the
wrong tribunal? The Supreme Court has not the power
to take cognizance of the question on such grounds. The
Court decided that the eighteenth amendment met all of the
formal requisites of proposal and ratification and is thus
a part of the Constitution. Beyond this, the Court cannot
go. The only tribunal which can give ear to these arguments is a constitutional convention, having due and proper
authority to speak for the people, the constitution makers.
"Vox populi, vox Dei."
JOS. F. INGHAM

EVIDENCE-SCOPE OF DYING DECLARATIONSRESTORATION OF ORIGINAL SCOPE-No case will
suggest the above heading more strongly than Donnelly v.
United States' and similar ones. In that case one Donnelly was tried for the murder of Chickasaw, an Indian,
in California. Evidence was sought to be introduced of a
dying confession of one Joe Dick, another Indian, which
confession was corroborated by other plausible circumstantial evidence. But the confession was excluded by a
majority of the court against the protest of three members-a strong minority protest. Justices Holmes, Hughes
and Lurton said that such a confession under the circum1228 U. S. 243; 33 Sup. Ct. 449 (1913).

